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Abstract
We study the design of public long-term care (LTC) insurance when the altruism of
informal caregivers is uncertain. We consider non-linear policies where the LTC benefit
depends on the level of informal care, which is assumed to be observable while children’s
altruism is not. The traditional topping up and opting out policies are special cases of
ours. Both total and informal care should increase with the children’s level of altruism.
This obtains under full and asymmetric information. Social LTC, on the other hand,
may be non-monotonic. Under asymmetric information, social LTC is lower than its
full information level for the lowest level of altruism, while it is distorted upward for
the higher level of altruism. This is explained by the need to provide incentives to high-
altruism children. The implementing contract is always such that social care increases
with formal care.
JEL classification: H2, H5.
Keywords: Long term care, uncertain altruism, private insurance, public insurance,
topping up, opting out.
1 Introduction
One particular lifetime risk that has recently garnered a lot of attention by economists is
the one associated with old-age dependency and long-term care (LTC). This arises when
the elderly depend on help to carry out daily activities. LTC is different from—albeit
often complementary to—health care and particularly terminal care or hospice care.
Dependent individuals do not only need medical care but also help with their everyday
life routines. Providing this type of assistance is labor intensive and often quite costly,
specially in severe cases of dependency that call for institutional care.
Currently, dependency presents the elderly with a significant financial risk of which
social insurance covers only a small part.1 At the same time, private insurance markets
for LTC are thin and very expensive.2 As a consequence, individuals often have to
rely on their own private savings or on the informal care their family members provide
(which estimates put at about two thirds of total LTC provision; see Norton (2000)).
This is often insufficient as it leaves the elderly who cannot count on family solidarity
without proper care.
More troubling are the various societal trends that point to an accelerating decline
in family involvement. Family solidarity closely depends on the survival of a spouse
and on the geographical proximity of children. Over the last decades, we have seen
an increasing number of elderly living alone because of divorce and widowhood. As
to the children, childless families are not infrequent and the mobility of children can
make any nursing assistance impossible. Increased female labor force participation,
population aging, and drastic changes in family values are other contributing factors.
Additionally, long-run trends aside, informal care is subject to many random shocks.
1See for instance Lipszyc et al. 2012). In most European countries (with the exception of Germany)
social health insurance does not pay for LTC. The specific program there are, like APA in France, covers
only a small fraction of actual cost. Similarly, in the US, Medicare does not cover LTC; Medicaid, which
is offered to families with minimal private sources, does.
2See for instance Brown and Finckelstein (2009, 2011).
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There are pure demographic factors such as widowhood, absence or loss of children;
divorce and migration too can be put in this category. Conflicts within the family or
financial problems incurred by children also prevent them from helping their parents.
This paper studies the role and design of LTC policy when informal care is uncertain.
This uncertainty is represented by a single parameter, β, referred to as the child’s degree
of altruism. One can also think about this as the (inverse of the) cost of providing care.
This parameter is not publicly observable and while parents may eventually observe it
this comes at a time when it is too late to make any decision. We concentrate on a
single generation of parents over their life-cycle. When young, they work, consume, and
save for their retirement. When old, they face the risk of becoming dependent. In case
of dependence, the level of informal care is determined by the parameter β which is
randomly distributed over some interval.
The original feature of our analysis is that we consider nonlinear policies linking the
public LTC transfer to the level of informal care, assuming that the latter is observable
but children’s altruism is not.
The issue of uncertain altruism and the role of social insurance in that context has
previously been studied by Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau (2014, 2017) and by Canta,
Cremer and Gahvari (2017). The first two of these papers concentrate on the case
where altruism is a binary variable. Children are either altruistic at some known degree
or not altruistic at all. The third paper, like the current one considers a continuous
distribution. All these papers consider a restricted set of policies and are agnostic
about the information structure.
To be more precise, they consider two types of LTC policies. The first one, referred
to as “topping up” (TU ) provides a transfer to dependent elderly, which is non exclusive
and can be supplemented by informal care. The second one, is an “opting out” scheme
(OO); it provides care which is exclusive and cannot be topped up. One of the main
messages that emerges from these studies is that none of these schemes appears to
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dominate in all circumstances. In particular the distribution of the degree of altruism
is an important factor.
Both policies are special cases of the nonlinear schemes we consider. Under TU, the
policy is flat and can in fact be implemented even when informal care is not observed.
Under OO, we have a decreasing scheme but with rather extreme features: social LTC
is positive is positive when informal care is zero and then jumps to zero as soon as some
informal care is provided. We will also revisit this problem by having a fresh look at
the TU vs. OO issue.
The distinction between TU and OO has been widely studied in the literature about
in-kind vs cash transfers.3 For instance, it has been shown to be relevant in the context
of education and health both from a normative and a positive perspective.4 In this
paper we remain agnostic about the exact nature of the transfer and instead focus on
its interaction with transfers within the family and specifically informal care provided
by children. Furthermore this literature typically focuses on redistributive concerns
while we concentrate on insurance issues. Individuals are identical ex ante, but they
face two types of risk: that of becoming dependent and, when dependent, the risk of
having children with a low degree of altruism.
A major concern raised by LTC policies is that of crowding out of informal care.5
This may make public LTC insurance ineffective for some persons and overall more
expensive. Within the context of informal care crowding out may occur both at the
intensive and the extensive margins. Intensive margin refers to the reduction of informal
care, possibly on a one by one basis, for parents who continue to receive aid from their
children, even when social LTC is available. Crowding out at the extensive margin, on
3For a review of the literature, see Currie and Gahvari (2008).
4On the normative side, for instance, Blomquist and Christiansen (1998) show that both regimes can
be optimal (to supplement an optimal income tax) depending on whether the demand for the publicly
provided good increases or decreases with labor. From a positive perspective, TU regimes may emerge
from majority voting rules, as shown by Epple and Romano (1996).
5See for instance Cremer, Pestieau and Ponthie`re (2012) and and Grabowski et al. (2012).
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the other hand, occurs when some children are dissuaded from providing any informal
care. The specific policies considered in the earlier literature have different impacts
on informal care. TU involves crowding out both at the intensive and the extensive
margins, whereas OO crowds out informal care solely at the extensive margin.
Since we assume that informal care is observable and can thus to some extent be
controlled, one might at first be tempted to think that crowding out is not an issue in
our setting. However, this conjecture does not stand under closer scrutiny. Even under
full information (about altruism) informal care is limited by the children’s participation
constraints. When the degree of altruism is not observable, children have to be given
the appropriate incentives to provide informal care. The design of the social insurance
scheme will then involve a tradeoff between power of incentives and informational rents.
Throughout the paper we concentrate on intra-generational issues; the cost of the
LTC program is borne by the generation who also benefits from it. In other words we
consider a single generation of parents. The role of children is limited to their decision
on the provision of informal care to their parents. The welfare of the grown-up children
does not figure in social welfare, which accounts only for the expected lifecycle utility of
parents. However, since children are subject to a participation constraint, their utility
does also matter. In other words, we maximize parents’ utilities for a given (minimum)
utility level of children which amounts to characterizing a Pareto-efficient allocation.
We first characterize the full information allocation, then turn to the case where neither
the government nor the parents observe the children’s level of altruism.
We show that, not surprisingly, both the consumption of dependent elderly and the
level of informal care should increase with the children’s level of altruism. This is the
case under both full and asymmetric information. Social LTC, on the other hand, may
be non-monotonic. On the one hand, children with a higher level of altruism provide
more informal care, which reduces the need for social insurance. On the other hand,
the more children care about their parents, the higher the optimal level of consumption
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of the latter. While the general expression is rather complicated our examples suggest
that, under full information, while the optimal LTC transfer may first be increasing
in β, it should decrease for larger levels of children’s altruism and eventually drop to
zero. This is in line with the idea that social LTC provides insurance against the risk
of having children with a low degree of altruism.
Under asymmetric information, the consumption of the dependent elderly is dis-
torted down for all levels of children’s altruism, except for the highest one. This is
the rather standard result of no distortion at the top, while the total care provided
to all other parents is distorted downward to reduce informational rents. The level of
informal care is also distorted down, except for the lowest level of altruism. Since in-
formal care can be considered as a transfer from children to parents, this result is also
intuitive and in line with traditional findings in contract theory. Finally, social LTC
under asymmetric information is lower than its full information level for the lowest level
of altruism. The opposite is true for the higher level of altruism, where g is distorted
upward. This may be surprising at first as it goes against the role of social care as
insurance against children with low levels altruism. Intuitively, under asymmetric infor-
mation, social LTC has to be distorted up at the top of the distribution in order to give
incentives to high-altruism children to provide the appropriate level of informal care.
This is more complicated under asymmetric information where incentive constraints
have to be accounted for (rather than just the participation constraints under full in-
formation). Consequently, the most altruistic children have to be bribed into providing
informal care by an increase in social care.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and derive the
laissez faire allocation. In Section 3 we characterize the optimal allocation under full
information. In Section 4 we turn to the case where the government does not observe the
children’s degree of altruism, and in Section 5 we provide some numerical illustration
of the results. Finally, in Section 6 we summarize the main results and examine their
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implication for the TU vs. OO debate.
2 The model
Consider a single generation of parents facing the risk of becoming dependent when they
are old and retired. If they become dependent, elderly parents may or may not receive
informal care from their grown-up children. This in turn depends on how altruistic the
children are. All parents are identical ex ante and each of them has one child to rely
upon.
The sequence of events is as follows. Period 0 is when the government designs and
announces its tax/transfer policy; this is the first stage of our game. In period 1, when
young working parents each have one child, pay taxes, and save a given fraction of
their income, s. No decision is made in this period. Finally, in period 2, parents have
grown old, are retired, and may be dependent. For parents who remain healthy in old
age, the game is over; they simply consume their savings. Dependent parents, on the
other hand, move to stage 2, where their children, who have by now turned into working
adults, decide if and how much informal care, a, they want to provide their parents with.
Dependent parents also recevice from the government a LTC transfer g conditional on
a.
All parents face two sources of uncertainty. The first concerns their state of health
in old age; they may either remain healthy or become dependent. The probability
of dependence, pi, is exogenously given and known. The second source of uncertainty
relates to the degree of altruism of their children when they grow up, which is represented
by β ∈ [0, β].6 The higher is β the more altruistic a child is. Children with β = 0 have no
altruistic feelings towards their parents. The random variable β is distributed according
to the distribution function F (β), with density f(β). We assume that the hazard rate
is increasing.
6We rule out β < 0, which represents a case where children are happier if their parents are worse off.
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The public policy consists of a menu of contracts (a(β), g(β)) offered to children,
where a ≥ 0 denotes the informal care that children provide to their dependent elderly
parents and g is the public LTC benefit. In order to finance the LTC benefits, a tax τ
is levied on young parents.
Parents provide a fixed labor supply when young, and they have no disutility asso-
ciated with working. Their labor income is equal to wL. Preferences are quasilinear in
consumption when young; risk aversion is introduced through the concavity of second-
period state dependent utilities. Denote the utility function for consumption when old
and healthy by U and when old and dependent by H. The parent’s life-time expected
utility is
EU = wL− τ − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piE [H (m)] , (1)
where E is the expectation operator. Parents pay the tax τ in the first period. In case
of dependence, they consume m = s + a + g. Assume that U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, U > 0,
U ′(0) =∞, and that the same properties hold for H. Further, for any given x we have
U ′(x) < H ′(x). We also assume that H ′(s) > 1. This ensures that, if parents do not
receive any informal care or LTC benefits, their marginal utility of consumption when
dependent is greater than their first-period marginal utility in consumptions. In other
words, parents would benefit from LTC insurance whose premium is paid in the first
period.
Assume that grown-up children too have quasilinear preferences and that their al-
truism towards their parents comes into play only if the parents become dependent.
The children’s utility function is represented by
u =
{
y − a+ βH (m) if the parent is dependent,
y if the parent is non dependent,
(2)
where y denotes the working children’s fixed income. No transfers are made to the
healthy elderly parents regardless of the size of their savings, s.
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2.1 Laissez faire
The altruistic children allocate an amount a of their income y to assist their dependent
parents, given the parents’ savings s. Its optimal level, a∗, is found through the max-
imization of equation (2). The first-order condition with respect to a is, assuming an
interior solution,
−1 + βH ′ (s+ a) = 0. (3)
Concavity of H ensures that the second-order condition is satisfied and that H ′ (s+ a)
is decreasing in a. Set a = 0 in the above equation and define β0(s) such that
β0 (s) ≡ 1
H ′ (s)
. (4)
This function represents the minimum level of β, for a given s, at which a positive level
of care is provided. We refer to a child with a β equal to the threshold level as the
“marginal child”. Differentiating (4) yields
dβ0
ds
= − H
′′
(H ′)2
> 0,
implying, not surprisingly, that an increase in parents’ savings reduces the likelihood of
children providing assistance in case of dependency.
Condition (3) implies that whenever β ≥ β0 > 0, a∗ satisfies 7
s+ a∗ =
(
H ′
)−1( 1
β
)
≡ m(β). (5)
Conversely, when β < β0, we have a
∗ = 0. The consumption of dependent parents is
then equal to
m =
{
s if β < β0,
m(β) if β ≥ β0.
(6)
7A corner solution at a = y, cannot be ruled out. To avoid a tedious and not very insightful
multiplication of cases we assume throughout the paper that the constraint a ≤ y is not binding in
equilibrium.
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It also follows, from equation (5) and dβ0/ds > 0, that savings crowd out informal care
in two ways. First, by increasing β0, an increase in savings makes it less likely that a
positive level of care is provided (crowding out at the extensive margin). Second, when
informal care is provided, it is crowded out on a one to one basis by savings as long as
the solution remains interior (crowding out at the intensive margin). Differentiating (6)
yields
dm
dβ
=
{
0 if β < β0,
−1
β2H′′(m) > 0 if β ≥ β0,
where the second line is positive because H is concave.8 As expected, a dependent
parent’s total consumption increases with the degree of altruism of their child. In other
words, parents are left without insurance against the risk of having a child with a low
degree of altruism. Figure 1 represents equation (6). It illustrates the consumption level
of dependent parents as a function of the child’s degree of altruism.
β
m
β0
s
m(β)
0
Figure 1: Laissez faire allocation: consumption of dependent parents as a function of
the children’s degree of altruism.
8The function m is not differentiable at β = β0. To avoid cumbersome notation we use dm/dβ for
the right derivative at this point.
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3 Full information
The government observes the type β of each child and sets a menu (a(β), g(β)) maxi-
mizing the ex ante utility of parents. The problem of the government is
max
a(β),g(β)
EU = wL− s− τ + (1− pi)u(s) + pi
∫ β
0
H(s+ a(β) + g(β))f(β)dβ
s.t. τ ≥ pi
∫
β
g(β)f(β)dβ
y − a(β) + βH (s+ a(β) + g(β)) ≥ y + βH(s) ∀β
a(β) ≥ 0, g(β) ≥ 0 ∀β,
where the first constraint is the government’s resource constraint and the second one is
the children’s participation constraint which stipulates that their utility must be at least
equal to a minimal level. We set this equal to their utility when they do not participate
in the provision of care, but setting this at any other arbitrary level would not change
the results. Under full information we simply calculate a Pareto-efficient allocation and
specifying a different utility level for children would yield another allocation on the
utility possibility curve, with otherwise similar properties; see the comments following
equation (10) for further discussion. As an alternative, one could have set the children’s
minimum utility at their LF level. Though, intuitively appealing this would be not be
consistent from a contract theory perpective. Specifically, once a goverment program is
in place, the LF may no longer be an option for them.9
The first constraint will hold with equality. Substituting it into the objective func-
9Such an assumption would not affect the qualititative results under full information. It would also
not change any result under asymmetric information because for β = 0 the non participation solution
corresponds to the LF and, as shown below, solely the participation constraint of this type binds.
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tion, the problem of the government can be rewritten as
max
a(β),g(β)
EU = wL− s− pi
∫ β
0
g(β)f(β)dβ + (1− pi)u(s)− piy
+ pi
∫ β
0
H(s+ a(β) + g(β))f(β)dβ
s.t. − a(β) + βH (s+ a(β) + g(β))− βH(s) ≥ 0 ∀β (7)
a(β) ≥ 0, g(β) ≥ 0 ∀β.
The first order conditions with respect to a(β) and g(β) are, respectively
∂EU
∂a
= piH ′(s+ a(β) + g(β))f(β) + λβ[βH ′(s+ a(β) + g(β))− 1] + µβ = 0, (8)
and
∂EU
∂g
= −pif(β) + piH ′(s+ a(β) + g(β))f(β) + λββH ′(s+ a(β) + g(β)) + νβ = 0, (9)
where λβ, µβ, and νβ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the participation con-
straint and the non-negativity constraints for the β-type child, respectively. Equation
(8) implies that λβ > 0 for all β: under full information the participation constraint is
binding for all children. Intuitively, if this was the case it would be possible to increase
EU by increasing a(β) until the constraint becomes binding.
We shall now use these conditions to study the properties of the solutions. In
particular we examine the possibility of both interior and corner solutions as well as the
shape of a(β) and g(β).
3.1 Interior solutions
When the solution is interior, combining (8) and (9) yields
(1 + β)H ′(s+ a(β) + g(β)) = 1, (10)
Interestingly, this conditions implies that parents receive more than full insurance. This
is because increasing insurance transfers (a or g) also makes them less expensive, since
children partially internalize them.
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Observe that while the policy is determined to maximize solely the parents welfare,
children’s utility effectively matters. Under full information the participation constraint
is binding for all children. Consequently the problem amounts to maximizing the par-
ents’ utility for a given level of the children’s welfare so that we effectively determine a
Pareto-efficient allocation.
Totally differentiating (10) yields
∂(g∗(β) + a∗(β))
∂β
= − H
′
(1 + β)H ′′
> 0. (11)
Consequently, under symmetric information, the total transfer to dependent parents
a+ g increases as the level of children altruism increases.
When the solution is interior the optimal policy under symmetric information is
such that (10) holds and the participation constraints of the children hold with equality.
Using (10), for each β the public transfer g can be expressed as a function of a of the
form
g∗(β) = m∗(β)− s− a∗(β), (12)
where m(β) = H ′−1(1/(1 + β)). Substituting for g in the participation constraints we
obtain
a∗(β) = βH(m(β))− βH(s). (13)
Differentiating this expression with respect to β yields, using (11)
∂a∗(β)
∂β
= H(m(β))−H(s)+βH ′(m(β))m′(β) = H(m(β))−H(s)− β
(1 + β)3H ′′(m(β))
,
(14)
which is positive as long as m(β) ≥ s. Not surprisingly informal care increases with the
level of children’s altruism.
The derivative of g(β) with respect to β is
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∂g∗(β)
∂β
= −H(m(β))+H(s)+[1−βH ′(m(β))]m′(β) = −H(m(β))+H(s)− 1
(1 + β)3H ′′(m(β))
.
(15)
The sign of this expression is ambiguous. On the one hand, as β increases, a(β) increases.
This reduces the government’s transfer. On the other hand, an increase in β entails
an increase of the optimal level of consumption when dependent, m(β), since altruistic
children partially internalize it. This increase g. The sign of the derivative then depends
on whether the optimal a(β) grows faster than the optimal m(β).
3.2 Corner solutions
We now turn to the issue of possible corner solutions. First, note that there exist no
β such that the solution implies neither informal nor social care: a∗(β) = g∗(β) = 0.
Suppose this was the case. Then, the participation constraint of type β would be
binding. But this constraint would continue to by satisfied when setting g(β) = ε, with
ε arbitrarily small, a policy which provides parents with a higher welfare as long as
H ′(s) > 1, so that parents enjoy insurance. This contradicts the fact that (a∗, g∗) is a
solution to the government problem.
Second, for β = 0, the solution implies a∗(0) = 0 and g∗(0) > 0. Irrespective on
the value of g, the participation constraint is satisfied only for a∗ = 0, which is then
the optimal value of informal care for the non-altruistic child. The first-order condition
with respect to g for β = 0 is then given by
∂EU
∂g
= −pif(0) + piH ′(s+ g)f(0) + ν0 = 0,
Under the assumption thatH ′ > 1, the transfer g is always interior, so thatH ′(s+g) = 1.
When the child is not altruistic, no informal care should (or could) be provided and
parents are insured through g.
Third, when β > 0, we never have a∗(β) = 0. To see this, assume that for some
β > 0 the solution to the government problem is (a∗, g∗) with a∗ = 0. But then, the
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participation constraint is satisfied with strict inequality, and it would continue to be
satisfied for a = ε, with ε arbitrarily small, a solution which implies a higher welfare
for the parents. This contradicts the fact that (a∗, g∗) is a solution to the government
problem.
Fourth, for any β ∈ (0, β0), where β0 is the marginal child in the laissez faire defined
by (4), a∗ > 0 and g∗ = 0 cannot be a solution. Suppose that for some β the solution
(a∗, g∗) is such that a∗ > 0 and g∗ = 0. This implies that there exist an a∗ > 0 such
that
a∗ = βH (s+ a∗)− βH(s). (16)
However, such a level a∗ exists if and only if β > β0, the threshold above which children
provide informal care in the laissez faire. To see this, notice that the LHS of (16) is a
linear function of a with slope 1 and intercept equal to zero. The RHS is increasing and
concave in a, and it is equal to zero if a = 0. Then, (16) is always satisfied at a = 0,
and there exist another positive solution if and only if the slope of the RHS evaluated
at a = 0 is greater than one, that is if and only if βH ′(s) > 1. But this in turn is the
case only when β > β0, with β0 defined by (4)
Finally, when β > β0, we may have either an interior solution or a corner solution
such that a > 0 and g = 0. A solution with a∗ > 0 and g∗ = 0 is characterized by
∂EU
∂a
= piH ′(s+ a∗)f(β) +λβ[βH ′(s+ a∗)− 1] = 0 ⇐⇒ λβ = piH
′(s+ a∗)f(β)
1− βH ′(s+ a∗) , (17)
∂EU
∂g
= −pif(β) + piH ′(s+ a∗)f(β) + λββH ′(s+ a∗) < 0, (18)
and (16). Condition (17) implies that 1− βH ′(s+ a∗) > 0. Intuitively, when g is equal
to zero, the level of informal care implied by a binding participation constraint is larger
than its laissez faire level. Substituting (17) into (18) yields
−1 + (1 + β)H ′(s+ a∗) < 0,
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so that an increase in g starting from 0 would indeed decrease welfare.
The results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that private savings are such that H ′(s) > 1. If the government
perfectly observes the level of altruism of the children, β, and if the level of informal
care, a, and the level of public LTC transfer, g, are contractible, the optimal policy
(a∗(β), g∗(β)) has the following properties:
(i) There exist no level of altruism β ≥ 0 such that (a∗(β), g∗(β)) = (0, 0), which
would imply that both types of care are equal to zero.
(ii) a∗(0) = 0 and g∗(0) > 0 is implicitly defined by H ′(s+ g∗(0)) = 1.
(iii) For all β ∈ (0, β0], with β0 defined by (4), (a∗(β), g∗(β)) is interior, and given
by (10) and (7).
(iv) For β ∈ (β0, β], corner solutions such that a(β) > 0 and g(β) = 0 are possible.
Otherwise, (a∗(β), g∗(β)) is given by (10) and (7).
(v) Parents’ consumption when old and dependent increases in β, and so does in-
formal care.
3.3 Implementation
Implementing the symmetric information policy requires (assuming that the solution of
the government’s proble is interior for all β)
g′a(a, β) = 1/β > 0 (19)
and
g(a∗(β), β) = g∗(β). (20)
To derive condition (19), note that the first order condition of a child facing a schedule
g(a) is
−1 + βH ′(m)[1 + g′a(a, β)] = 0.
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This expression is satisfied by the full information solution as defined by (10) when
g′a(a, β) = 1/β > 0. In words, social LTC must increase with the level of informal care.
Combining (19) and (20) it then follows that, under symmetric information, the
first-best allocation can be decentralized by assigning to each type β a function
g(a, β) =
1
β
a+ [g∗(β)− 1
β
a∗(β)].
The implementing function for any given β is thus an affine function. Its slope decreases
in β as well as its vertical intercept because
∂[g∗(β)− 1βa∗(β)]
∂β
= m′(β)[1− (1 + β)H ′(m(β))]− 1 + β
β
[H(m(β))−H(s)] < 0,
where the sign follows from (10) and from m(β) ≥ s.
4 Asymmetric information
Under asymmetric information, the utility of a child with altruism parameter β reporting
β˜ is
uc(β, β˜) = y + βH(s+ a(β˜) + g(β˜))− a(β˜). (21)
Incentive compatibility implies that
∂uc(β, β˜)
∂β˜
|
β˜=β
= 0. (22)
Then, an incentive compatible policy has to satisfy the local incentive compatibility
constraint
∂uc(β)
∂β
= H(s+ a+ g) > 0. (23)
In words, under asymmetric information children should get a rent that is increasing
with their level of altruism.
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The problem of the government is now
max
a(β),g(β)
EU = wL− s− τ + (1− pi)u(s) + pi
∫
β
H(s+ a(β) + g(β))f(β)dβ
s.t. τ ≥ pi
∫
β
g(β)f(β)dβ
uc(β) = y + βH(s+ a(β) + g(β))− a(β) ∀β (24)
uc(β) ≥ y + βH(s) ∀β (25)
u˙c = H(s+ a(β) + g(β)). (26)
In addition to the participation constraint of the children, the government has now
to fulfill the local incentive compatibility constraint.10 Since uc is increasing, and uc
increases faster than y + βH(s) as long as a+ g ≥ 0, only the participation constraint
of the lowest altruism type will be binding. When a + g = 0, on the other hand, we
have bunching over the relevant interval. We neglect this issue in the analytical part,
but this possibility is illustrated in the second and third example provided in Section 5.
max
a(β),g(β)
pi
∫
β
[H(s+ a(β) + g(β))− g(β)]f(β)dβ
s.t. uc = y + βH(s+ a(β) + g(β))− a(β) ∀β
u˙c = H(s+ a(β) + g(β)).
The corresponding Hamiltonian is
H = [H(s+ a+ g)− g]f(β) + ηβ(uc − y − βH(s+ a+ g) + a) + µβH(s+ a+ g) (27)
where uc is the state variable, a and g are the control variables, ηβ is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the first constraint, and µβ is the co-state.
The first order conditions are
∂H
∂a
= piH ′(s+ a+ g)f(β) + ηβ(1− βH ′(s+ a+ g)) + µβH ′(s+ a+ g) = 0, (28)
10The second order condition of the individual revelation problem is that m(β) is non-decreasing. We
assume for the moment that this condition is satisfied, and show that this is indeed the case for the
aymmetric information solution.
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∂H
∂g
= −pif(β) + piH ′(s+ a+ g)f(β)− ηββH ′(s+ a+ g)) + µβH ′(s+ a+ g) = 0, (29)
∂H
∂uc
= ηβ = −µ˙β, (30)
and
∂H
∂µ
= H(s+ a+ g) = u˙c (31)
Substituting (28) into (29) yields −pif(β) = ηβ. Since µ˙β = −ηβ = pif(β) and µβ = 0
from the transversality condition, the co-state can be rewritten as
µβ = −
∫ β
β
pif(β)dβ = −pi(1− F (β)). (32)
Using the expression above and proceeding by substitution, conditions (28) and (29)
yield
− 1 + (1 + β)H ′(s+ a+ g) + µβ
pif(β)
H ′(s+ a+ g) = 0
⇐⇒
[
(1 + β)− 1− F (β)
f(β)
]
H ′(s+ a+ g) = 1. (33)
With respect to the case with symmetric information, the sum a + g is now distorted
down in order to relax incentive compatibility constraints. Denoting by AI asymmetric
information and FI asymmetric information, mAI(β) = mFI(β), and mAI(β) < mFI(β)
for all β < β. Under the increasing hazard rate property, 1+β−(1−F (β))/f(β) increases
in β and is positive if β = β. Then two cases are possible. If (1 − 1/f(0))H ′(s) ≥ 1,
then the solution of (33) is always interior with g(β) + a(β) > 0 and increasing in β. If
(1− 1/f(0))H ′(s) < 1, then there exist a threshold β˜ ∈ (0, β) such that g(β) +a(β) = 0
for all β ≤ β˜, and g(β) + a(β) > 0 and increasing for β > β˜.
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Assuming an interior solution for all β ≥ 0, using the children incentive compatibility
and participation constraint of the lowest type, we obtain11
uc(β) = y +
∫ β
0
H(m(z))dz, (34)
and substituting uc(β) with its value in (24) yields
a(β) = βH(m(β))−
∫ β
0
H(m(z))dz. (35)
The solution for the government problem is given by (33) and (35). Using the partici-
pation constraints and (34) we have∫ β
0
H(m(z))dz ≥ βH(s).
Then,
a(β) ≤ βH(m(β))− βH(s),
with the condition holding with strict inequality for all β > 0. This condition im-
plies that, for all β, aAI(β) < a∗(β). Since mAI(β) = m∗(β), one has that, for the
highest altruism type, β, gAI(β) > g∗(β). Conversely, for the lowest altruism type
mAI(0) < m∗(0) and aAI(0) = a∗(0) = 0 so that gAI(0) < g∗(0). The consumption of
dependent parents, mAI(β), is non-decreasing, and strictly increases whenever the so-
lution is interior. Then, aFI is also non-decreasing and strictly increases if the solution
is interior.
Our results are summarized in the following proposition
11If If (1− 1/f(0))H ′(s) < 1, then
uc(β) =
{
y + βH(s) if β ≤ β˜,
y + β˜H(s) +
∫ β
β˜
H(m(z))dz if β > β˜,
and
a(β) =
{
0 if β ≤ β˜,
βH(m(β))− β˜H(s)− ∫ β
β˜
H(m(z))dz. if β > β˜,
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Proposition 2 Assume that private savings are such that H ′(s) > 1. When the level
of children’s altruism, β, is not publicly observable, while the level of informal care, a,
and the level of LTC insurance, g, are contractible, the optimal policy (aAI(β), gAI(β))
has the following properties:
(i) If (1−1/f(0))H ′(s) < 1, then there exist a threshold β˜ ∈ (0, β) such that gAI(β)+
aAI(β) = 0 for all β ≤ β˜, and gAI(β) + aAI(β) > 0 and increasing for β > β˜.
(ii) If (1− 1/f(0))H ′(s) > 1, then for all β gAI(β) + aAI(β) ≥ 0 and increasing.
(ii) For all β < β, we have mAI(β) < m∗(β) (downward distortion of total care)
while mAI(β) = m∗(β) (no distortion at the top).
(ii) For all β > 0, we have aAI(β) < a∗(β), while aAI(0) = a∗(0) = 0.
(iv) Social LTC satisfies gAI(0) < g∗(0) and gAI(β) > g∗(β).
(v) Parents’ consumption when old and dependent, mAI(β), is non-decreasing in β,
and so is informal care, aAI(β).
4.1 Implementation
The implementation of the above allocation (assuming that the solution of the govern-
ment’s problem is interior for all β) implies a function g(a) such that the solution to
the children’s problem is equal to aAI(β). Unlike in the full information case, g cannot
be conditioned on β; the same function g(a) applies to all types. Combining (33) with
the children’s first order condition we obtain
β(1 + g′(a)) = (1 + β)− 1− F (β)
f(β)
⇐⇒ g′(a) = 1
β
{
1− 1− F (β)
f(β)
}
, (36)
where β = (aAI)−1(a). According to (33), 1−1/f(0) ≥ 0 is a necessary condition for the
solution to be interior for all β. If this is the case, the increasing hazard rate property
implies that 1− (1−F (β))/f(β) > 0 for all β, which in turns implies that g′(a) > 0 for
all levels of a. In words, the consumption of the parents in the laissez faire would be
too low with respect to the asymmetric information optimal allocation. Then, the LTC
20
policy provides extra incentives to children to provide informal care. It is also easy to
verify that, g′(aAI(β)) = 1/β.
Under asymmetric information, the slope g′(a) as defined in (36) is always smaller
than the slope of the schedule g(a) under full information, g′a(a, β) = 1/β, except for the
highest altruism type. This is due to the fact that a is distorted down under asymmetric
information.
5 Illustration
In this section we illustrate the results of Proposition 1 and 2 using explicit functional
forms for H and F .
First, we assume H(m) = ln(m) + C, and that F (β) = 2β, so that β is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1/2. We also assume that s = 0.5, so thatH ′ > 1 for all β, and
that C = − ln(0.4), so that H > 0 for all β. These assumptions ensure that the solution
of the full and asymmetric information problems are both interior. Figures 2 presents
the full and asymmetric information levels of dependent parents’ consumption (net of
savings), informal care, and LTC transfer as functions of children’s altruism. Parents
consumption and informal care are both increasing in β, as it was shown analytically.
Furthermore, both m and g are distorted down under asymmetric information. The
optimal LTC transfer displays a different pattern. Under full information, it is first
increasing and then increasing in β. Under asymmetric information this is not the case
any more, as gAI increases in β. In this case, the need to provide incentives to informal
care givers prevails over the insurance motive of the LTC policy.
We then turn to the case where H(m) = ln(m) − ln(0.4), F (β) = β, and s = 0.5.
In words, we consider now a uniform distribution of β between zero and one. The
optimal policy is illustrated in Figure 3. In this case β˜ = 0.25. Below this threshold
aAI + gAI = 0. Except for these corner solutions, the pattern is similar to the one
depicted in Figure 2.
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Finally, we consider a different functional form for the utility function of the depen-
dent, H(m) = mε/ε, with ε = 0.5, keeping s = 0.5 and F (β) = β. The optimal policy,
illustrated in Figure 4, is qualitatively similar to the ones in Figures 2 and 3.
6 Summary and concluding comments
This papers has studied the design of public LTC insurance when children’s altruism
and thus informal care is uncertain. We have considered non-linear policies where the
LTC benefit depends on the amount of informal care received, assuming that the latter
is observable but children’s altruism is not. The traditional TU and OO policies are
special cases of ours.
We have shown that, both total care and informal care received by parents should
increase with the children’s level of altruism. This is the case both under full and
asymmetric information. Social LTC, on the other hand, may be non-monotonic. Our
examples suggest that while it may first be increasing in β, it should decrease for larger
levels of child altruism and eventually drop to zero. This is in line with the idea that
social LTC provides insurance against the risk of having children with a low degree of
altruism.
Under asymmetric information, the consumption of dependent elderly is distorted
down for all levels of children’s altruism, except for the highest one. The level of
informal care is also distorted down, except for the lowest level of altruism. These are
rather classical contract theory results. More interestingly, social LTC under asymmetric
information is lower than its full information level for the lowest level of altruism. The
opposite is true for the higher level of altruism, where it is distorted upward. While
this goes against the role of social care as insurance against children with low levels
altruism, it is explained by the need to provide incentives. Intuitively, under asymmetric
information, social LTC has to be distorted up at the top of the distribution in order
to give incentives to high-altruism children to provide the appropriate level of informal
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Figure 2: Optimal consumption of dependent parents (net of private savings), informal
care, and LTC insurance as a function of the children’ s altruism. Case with H(m) =
ln(m) − ln(0.4), F (β) = 2β, and s = 0.5. Superscript AI denotes the asymmetric
information case, * denotes the full information case)
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Figure 3: Optimal consumption of dependent parents (net of private savings), infor-
mal care, and LTC insurance as a function of the children’ s altruism. Case with
H(m) = ln(m)−ln(0.4), F (β) = β, and s = 0.5. Superscript AI denotes the asymmetric
information case, * denotes the full information case)
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Figure 4: Optimal consumption of dependent parents (net of private savings), infor-
mal care, and LTC insurance as a function of the children’ s altruism. Case with
H(m) = m/, F (β) = β,  = 0.5 and s = 0.5. Superscript AI denotes the asym-
metric information case, * denotes the full information case)
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care.
Returning to the TU vs. OO issue mentioned in the Introduction the optimal policy
obviously corresponds to neither of these special case. It is not flat and while under
full information public LTC may eventually drop to zero for sufficiently large levels of
a (and β) the schedule does not resemble and OO policy either, which would have a
discontinuity at zero. Under asymmetric information, on the other hand, g will be larger
than under full information for large β’s and our illustration suggests that it may even
be increasing all along. This is because altruistic children have to be provided with
incentives not to mimick children with lower levels of altruism. This draws us even
further away from TU or OO.
From a practical perspective the main lesson is that what we need is not a social
system that can be topped up by informal care but provide social LTC to supplement or
top up private care. In other words, ther should be no penalty for informal care through
a reduction of social care. Quite the opposite, social care has to increase sufficiently
with informal care to provide the appropriate incentives to caregivers. While informal
care is in reality difficult to observe so that the implementation of such a policy is not
trivial, it does not appear to be impossible. When informal care is “rewarded” by extra
social care, families have no incentive to hide it and some degree of observability, albeit
imperfect, is not unrealistic.
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